

That a new chapter had opened was admitted for the first time by Cambon on June 11. "I foresee extremely grave difficulties," remarked the Chancellor. "Perhaps," rejoined the Ambassador,^c but no one can prevent Morocco falling under our influence some day. It seems to me that we could examine the questions which interest us and seek to afford German opinion the satisfactions which would allow it to watch developments without anxiety." "Go and see Kiderlen at Kissingen," replied Bethmann. Here was the first hint of compensation, which it would have been wiser to offer before instead of after the expedition to Fez.

The situation in Morocco, began Kiderlen in the historic conversation of June 21, had been completely transformed, with forces under French officers throughout the country and the Sultan at the orders of France. *^e Have you forgotten the pact of 1909, which recognizes French political influence? interjected the Ambassador. "Influence is not Protectorate," rejoined the Foreign Minister. "You are on the road to a veritable Protectorate. That is not in the pacts of 1906 and 1909, any more than your occupation of the Shawia and the East." * Cambon remarked that it was not easy in dealing with an uncivilized Government to fix how far influence could go, and he proposed a general discussion like that of England and France in 1903-4. "I agree," * replied Kiderlen. "If we keep to Morocco we shall not succeed. It is useless to prop up a tottering structure." Here the Ambassador uttered a *caveat*. "If you want part of Morocco, French opinion would not stand it. One could look elsewhere." "Yes," replied Kiderlen, "but you must tell us what you wish." At parting he exclaimed: "Bring us back something from Paris."

Up to this point the policy of Germany had been irre-

proachable. She possessed treaty rights and commercial interests in Morocco. Courteous warnings had produced no effect. French troops had entered Fez, but no offer of compensation was forthcoming till June 1, and then only in the vaguest form. Now it was too late, for the Foreign Minister had made up his mind. In April he had told Weizsacker, the Premier of his native Wurttemberg, that he was meditating the occupation of Agadir. A Foreign Office Memorandum, dated May 30, argued that north Morocco would soon be French, that military domination would involve commercial privilege, and that French public opinion would